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Abstract 
The DoD and the military services are currently working to provide widget and app storefronts 
to disseminate applications that enable agile, composable, C2 capabilities. Leveraging the 
government-developed open source Ozone Widget Framework, web applications can be 
registered in a single repository, and discovered and composed by the warfighter. Through 
both process and technical means, the DoD Applications Store works to streamline the 
software acquisitions process. The DoD Applications Store as an Ozone Marketplace will 
include automated delivery of software patches, web applications, widgets, and mobile 
application packages. The envisioned application store will deliver software from a central 
repository, over the land or air, to the warfighter at the tactical edge, thereby increasing C2 
agility.  
Through the last several years SPAWAR SSC Pacific, PEO C4I, and DISA have moved to 
implement this framework, and thereby have discovered a number of additional benefits and 
encountered previously unknown obstacles. As the DoD has moved to emphasize the 
importance of efficiency and cost savings, the savings presented by this agile C2 solution 
have grown even more important as the current methods of distributing software components 
to the tactical edge are time consuming and costly. The ability to distribute applications 
packages to the tactical edge is technically feasible; the entrenched processes and 
methodologies in DoD acquisition have been a roadblock to this effort. This paper examines 
the technical and non-technical acquisition lessons learned through the effort to implement 
the DoD application store on an Ozone Widget Framework. 
Introduction 
As the United States military services and the overarching U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) moves to encourage and enable agile C2, a major hurdle still stand in the 
way: an acquisition system geared towards procuring large items, like air craft carriers, 
rather than continuously evolving software applications. As many defense experts have 
observed over the last decade, the DoD acquisition system has been plagued with ongoing 
problems in the performance of the weapons acquisition programs including cost growth and 
schedule delay. These difficulties have been particularly apparent in the realm of hardware 
and software needed to create the command and control (C2) tools to enable agile C2 and 
lead to decision superiority.  
The problems in acquiring the tools necessary to enable agile C2 are particularly 
important given the premium that the U.S. Services, and the U.S. Navy in particular, has 
placed upon the need for decision superiority. To enable effective maritime superiority and 
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maintain global maritime awareness, the U.S. Navy has made information a “main battery” 
of its arsenal. Information, when networked across joint, allied, and coalition forces enables 
commanders with the ability to cooperatively create a common operating picture—to better 
able to see what is over the horizon faster than the adversary. As noted in the U.S. Navy’s 
2010 Vision for Information Dominance, 
[T]he Navy will create a fully integrated C2, information, intelligence, 
cyberspace, environmental awareness, and networks operations capability 
and wield it as a weapon and instrument of influence.1  
Enhancing its proficiency at operating within the information domain will also allow 
the Navy to better respond to a rapidly changing battlespace as it takes advantage of 
advanced IT and networks; develop a global enterprise through network centric operations 
and command and control (C2); and elevate the use of information as a main weapon 
alongside traditional weapons.  
As the world becomes “a global multipolar one with gaps in national power 
continuing to narrow between developed and developing countries,”2 the United States is 
facing increasing economic pressures at home. The recent cuts in the U.S. defense budget, 
and the strong possibility that more are forthcoming, have precipitated a vigorous strategic 
analysis within the defense community. The recently released documents Sustaining U.S. 
Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense3 and Defense Budget Priorities and 
Choices4 lay out the United States’ military response to fiscal pressures at home and 
uncertainty abroad. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense—
otherwise known as the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG)—notes that “the global security 
environment presents an increasingly complex set of challenges and opportunities to which 
all elements of U.S. national power must be applied.”5 As such, despite budget pressures, 
For the foreseeable future the United States will continue to take an active 
approach to countering these threats by monitoring the activities of non-state 
threats worldwide, working with allies and partners to establish control over 
ungoverned territories and directly striking the most dangerous groups and 
individuals when necessary. 6 
The United States will perform this task in part by being selective about committing its 
forces. The DSG states, “our forces must be capable of deterring and defeating aggression 
by an opportunistic adversary in one region even when our forces are committed to a large-
-‐ scale operation elsewhere.”7 This is a change from the previous “two-war doctrine” in 
which the United States maintained the capability to fight two full-scale wars simultaneously. 
The Defense Budget Priorities and Choices states, “this strategic precept puts a premium on 
                                            
 
 
1 Department of the Navy (DoN), Vision for Information Dominance (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 
2010). 
2 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Global Trends 2025, vi.  
3 DoD, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC: Author, 2012). 
4 DoD) Defense Budget Priorities and Choices (Washington, DC: Author, 2012). 
5 DoD, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC: Author, 2012), 1. 
6 DoD, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC: Author, 2012), 1. 
7 DoD, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, 1. 
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self- and rapidly- deployable forces that can project power and perform multiple mission 
types.”8 
As the U.S. faces the uncertain, rapidly changing security environment described in 
its strategic documents, “[a]gility is increasingly becoming recognized as the most critical 
characteristic of a transformed force, with network-centricity being understood as the key to 
achieving agility.” Today, agility is no longer “merely an attribute of the C2 system,” 9 instead 
“military establishments have recognized that ability considerations must permeate the 
mission capability package, operational concept, or force” 10 (emphasis in original). 
This paper will focus on the possibility that the use of widgets and applications, 
hosted on a DoD-wide applications store, using the Ozone Widget Framework, can enable 
agile C2 by utilizing an agile acquisition and governance process to quickly deploy 
composable C2 capabilities to the U.S. fleet. The work at the U.S. Navy’s Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Center Pacific has shown this approach to be technically feasible, but 
there have been significant challenges in adjusting the acquisition process to facilitate the 
quick deployment.  
Widget & App Stores 
One recent innovation, both in the technology and its operational use, is the growing 
importance of widgets and applications offered to the warfighter through an application 
storefront. The use of widgets and apps increases the agility of a military unit, be it a 
commander in a command center or a sailor deployed on a cruiser. Through widgets and 
specialized apps the warfighter can easily access data to increase situational awareness as 
well as connect rapidly with a command center. They provide the command center and the 
warfighter the ability to rapidly adapt their information sources to their information needs. 
The widgets, each providing tailored information and services, can be composed in a variety 
of ways for the warfighter to tailor the specific information that is needed, while culling the 
information that is unnecessary for the task at hand.  
Currently, the C2 systems for warfighters are designed to perform a single mission. 
Each ship or unit is outfitted with the C2 information and tools that are applicable to the 
mission that it is deployed to do. If there is enough room, then alternate tools may be 
loaded, but given the information storage constraints in any deployment, be it naval or 
expeditionary, there is finite space for additional C2 tools not tailored to the current mission. 
Basically, the current process puts as many capabilities in one bag as can fit and sends the 
units out to perform within that bag of capabilities requiring different units to have different 
fixed sets of capabilities and to be constrained to those actions only. Thus the warfighters 
face the challenge that their C2 abilities are limited by the tools that they deploy with. This 
limitation constrains the warfighters’ ability to quickly change missions without returning to 
base. Widget and app offered in a storefront combined with an afloat cloud environment will 
enable a any warfighting unit to change its C2 capabilities to respond to changing mission 
requirements, without necessitating a return to its base.  
                                            
 
 
8 DoD, Defense Budget Priorities and Choices (Washington, DC: Author, 2012), 7. 
9 David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge (Washington, DC: DoD Command and Control 
Research Program, 2005), 126. 
10 David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge (Washington, DC: DoD Command and Control 
Research Program, 2005), 127. 
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The wave of the future is to provide composeable capabilities for all units. Emerging 
needs, codified in the DoD’s strategic documents require the U.S. to continue to provide for 
a shrinking military and an expanding global need. As the DSG states, “[w]henever possible, 
we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security 
objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities” 11 (emphasis 
in original). The idea of composeable warfighter is not new, however, it is possible today. 
The ability to provide Widgets, applications, application bundles, and services on demand to 
the warfighter to reconfigure the mission capabilities, will allow commanders to change 
mission parameters of any unit. The unit in turn would be able to turn off and turn on 
capability packages as required meeting mission requirements. This innovative approach 
will enable agile C2 even in a DIL environment and as a mission set evolves.  
The major enabler of this is the ability to expose and discover these capabilities by 
the warfighter. Storefronts on enterprise and deployed networks provide the ability to 
instantiate software and platform as a service is key element to providing the composeable 
mission capability. 
These devices are innovative in that they also provide warfighters with the ability to 
provide pertinent data to the central command center thereby increasing the total situational 
awareness. The DoD and the military services are currently working to provide widget and 
app storefronts to disseminate applications. The storefronts will enable the developers of the 
widgets and apps to be more responsive to user needs by allowing them to field innovative 
products tailored to current needs quickly. The DoD has only started to make inroads within 
this environment with several Programs of Record (POR) embracing widgets and other 
mobile technologies, hoping to enhance warfighter situational awareness and access to 
information. Unfortunately, the Defense Acquisition System has not adapted to this new 
environment, making it difficult to field these technologies rapidly to meet emergent 
requirements. 
Ozone Widget Framework (OWF) 
What Is a Widget? 
Widgets are lightweight, single-purpose web-enabled applications that users can 
configure to their specific needs. Widgets can provide summary information or a limited view 
into a larger application and can be used alongside related widgets to provide an integrated 
view as required by the user. 
OWF 
The Ozone Widget Framework (OWF) is a platform that offers infrastructure services 
to simplify the development of workflows and presentation-tier application integration. It is 
also a layout manager for the operation of widgets on a single web page. Widgets, which 
are web applications that can be installed and executed in a web browser, display 
information or provide dynamic content from a backend or local service. Just like any widget 
framework, OWF supplies the structure and templates for creating widgets providing users 
with the capability to develop, share, and operate widgets. Unlike a standard browser 
                                            
 
 
11 DoD, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC: Author, 2012), 
3. 
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window, OWF allows users to load and operate multiple widgets within a single webpage 
rather than opening multiple browser windows or tabs to display more than one widget. This 
allows users to view a great amount of information on a single browser interface. From an 
intelligence analyst’s standpoint, the OWF provides a means to conveniently search, 
access, and display intelligence data on a single display. Furthermore, the OWF allows the 
user to adapt their information flows, by adding, deleting or modifying the loaded widgets, in 
miniscule amount of time. In under a minute, an OWF operator can change the information 
they have access to allowing the user to agilely adjust to any changing circumstance. 
OWF allows users to load widgets, select a layout type called a dashboard layout, 
and customize the arrangement of the widgets within the dashboard. OWF supports multiple 
dashboard layouts including desktop, tabbed, portal, and accordion. The desktop layout 
allows users to arrange and drag widgets anywhere within the browser window much like a 
desktop application on a standard operating system desktop. The tabbed, portal, and 
accordion layouts fix the widget positions in the browser, but users are able to select which 
widgets are assigned to the fixed locations creating a customized display. The dashboard 
layout and arrangement of widgets is saved when a user logs out of the OWF so the next 
time the account is accessed the entire layout is maintained. Thus, a user could have a 
dashboard specifically targeted to address multiple scenarios; this moves the operator away 
from the stovepiped information system.  
The OWF, originally developed and sponsored by the National Security Agency 
(NSA) as a Government Off-The-Shelf (GOTS) solution, is now Government Open-Source 
Software (GOSS) with a collaborative software development model. The OWF GOSS 
Program is responsible for the maintenance of OWF and Ozone Marketplace (OMP) 
software releases. The OWF GOSS board, comprised of members from NSA, ODNI, DoD, 
CIA, DISA, SPAWAR, NRO, and INSCOM,12 can distribute development priorities to any 
government agency or program requesting the source code for either its own use or for 
updating. These agencies are encouraged to submit software patches and feature 
enhancements to improve the baseline code and benefit the community of projects utilizing 
the OWF and OMP. The OWF also provides a suite of application programming interfaces 
(APIs) that give widget developers the ability to further their web applications using inter-
widget communication, user preferences, and internationalization. Each API is written in 
JavaScript so that widgets can be built in a large variety of web technologies. Therefore, 
widgets can be written in the JavaScript capable technology of the developer’s choice. The 
ability of each agency to customize their APIs further allows for quick responsiveness.  
Widgets in Action 
The power of widgets and apps to provide agile C2 is being recognized across the 
DoD. The recognition of the power of these apps is driving a push to change the acquisition 
structure of these products to allow them to be fielded in a responsive manner. The Navy’s 
Program Executive Office for Command, Control, Computers, Communications and 
Intelligence (PEO C4I) located at the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center (SPAWAR) 
                                            
 
 
12 The OWF GOSS board includes members from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Center (SPAWAR), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and United States Army Intelligence 
and Security Command (INSCOM). 
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is actively working to implement a storefront and a widget acceptance process through 
which widgets can be fielded through an already existing program of record and thereby 
reach the user in a timely fashion. Command and Control and Intelligence widgets as well 
as the Ozone Market Place (OMP) provide examples of this embrace of widgets. These C2 
widgets when fielded provide agile C2 capabilities in response to emergent warfighter 
requirements.  
PEO C4I Storefront Overview 
Before new capabilities are made available to the warfighter, they must undergo 
developmental tests, operational tests, and a strict certification and accreditation (C&A) 
process. All of which can take as long as nine months, enough time for the “new” technology 
to become out of date and unresponsive to immediate user needs. One of PEO C4I’s 
FY2012 Strategic Goals is to “[f]oster focused innovation to rapidly field relevant capabilities 
to meet existing and emerging warfighter needs.”13 Widgets provide a technological 
capability to foster this rapid fielding ability and provide the potential to rapidly implement 
C4ISR and operational capabilities to the warfighter. Widgets are being deployed in the 
Navy operational environment as part of formal software builds and releases for Programs of 
Record (PoRs). The PEO C4I Storefront and a governance process specific to widgets 
submitted by an accredited PoR will reduce lead times and ensure that widgets are 
efficiently and securely introduced in a production environment for the warfighter. 
Using the widget framework the operator is not only able to be successful but is able 
to maintain “success in light of changed or changing circumstances”14 a key component of 
agile C2. The PEO C4I Storefront provides an example of how quickly widgets can be 
created and fielded when they are associated with an already accredited PoR. It behooves 
the DoD to examine its acquisition paths and to adopt widgets and associated storefronts at 
an accelerated pace in order to enable agile C2. The DoD must also work to establish the 
storefronts in order to enable deployed commanders to effectively compose their C2 
capabilities even in DIL environments. As Global Trends 2030 notes “the future world order 
will be shaped by human agency as much as unfolding trends and unanticipated events” 
(Global Trends 2030, p. 3). Thus it behooves the DoD to enable its commands to be able to 
respond to these events with innovative approaches as exemplified by the use of widget and 
application storefronts described in this paper.  
The Navy seeks to increase the speed at which new capabilities are provided to the 
warfighter by creating an efficient test, verification and validation process to govern widgets. 
Figure 1 depicts the operational concept of the Navy Storefront. A widget developer 
produces a widget which he submits to the T&I Storefront Environment for testing. The Navy 
Widget Test and Integration (T&I) Team provides feedback to the widget developer on 
improvements needed to make the widget compliant with the Operational Storefront 
standards. Upon completion of all testing, the widget is promoted to the Operational 
Storefront Environment. From there, the Operational User can discover the widget from a 
Marketplace (applications store) and consume the capability in an operational environment. 
                                            
 
 
13 PEO C4I Strategic Plan 2012–2017. (San Diego, CA: PEO C4I, 2011), 6. Retrieved from 
http://www.public.navy.mil/spawar/PEOC4I/Documents/PEO_C4I_StrategicPlan[FY12].pdf 
14 Alberts, The Agility Advantage, 66. 
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Ultimately, the operational user can provide feedback about the widget to build on the 
existing capability or to inspire new capabilities.  
 
 Navy Storefront Operational Concept 
Widget Governance Tool 
Widget governance is how an organization establishes and controls its processes 
and policies regarding widgets. It includes a system to track and record where a widget is 
within a widget process and checks for its compliance with existing policies. By establishing 
an efficient test and evaluation process to govern widgets and approve their acceptance into 
a marketplace, the lead time for a developmental concept to reach the warfighter can be 
greatly reduced. 
The following, described in Figure 2, is an overview of the widget governance tool 
that governs widgets beginning with its initial submission to the widget governance process 
to its acceptance into the operational environment where it is becomes available for use by 
the warfighter. 
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Widget Governance Process Overview 
 
 Widget Governance Process Overview 
Developers provide widgets to Programs of Record (PoR) which expose capabilities 
in a widget framework (1). The widgets must meet Entrance Criteria for introduction to the 
Test and Integration (T&I) environment (2), which includes the source code, descriptive 
metadata, configuration documentation, and developer testing results for the target 
production environment. Applying Navy approved processes, the widget passes through a 
number of manual and automated tests to ensure suitability for the production Storefront 
environment (3). Upon review of the test results which verify that the widget meets the exit 
criteria (4), the widget is approved to be introduced into the Storefront operational 
environment (5) and is made readily available to the warfighter. The following, detailed in 
Figure 3, is a detailed process flow for the widget governance tool. 
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 Detailed Widget Governance Process Flow 
A Widget Submission Package (WSP) is submitted (1) which contains source code 
and documentation of the widget and application programming interface (API), as well as 
metadata describing the function, user guidance, characteristics, boundaries and 
deployment locations, preferred browser and system configuration, installation instructions 
and dependencies. Developer Functional, IA and Integration Test Reports are also included, 
as well as a Mobile Code risk mitigation strategy and a statement that the widget has been 
developed in accordance with mobile code developer’s guidance and a Security Technical 
Implementation Guide (STIG) report. All required components of the WSP are indexed for 
ready reference. If the package does not pass the Acceptance test (1), a report of 
deficiencies is provided and the submitter is provided the opportunity to edit and correct the 
submission (2). If the WSP passes the Acceptance subprocess, the package is provided for 
Functional, IA, and Integration Testing subprocesses in the T&I environment (3). 
The Functional, IA, and Integration testing is conducted in parallel to the greatest 
extent possible in order to optimize testing resources and make the procession of the WSP 
through the process efficient (4). Functional testing will focus on the proper operation of the 
widget in generating the desired output in a widget as described by the PoR. Integration 
testing will concentrate on how well the widget performs in the Storefront environment (e.g., 
with the widget framework, identity management solution, etc.) and also amidst other 
widgets. IA testing will ensure that the widget meets OWF standards, that backend services 
and data inherit configuration attributes from their accredited parent environments, that 
information is exchanged over a secure channel, and that the widget operates in a manner 
which ensures an acceptable level of security. Some tests will be conducted manually by the 
T&I Testing Team, but automation is desired to the greatest extent possible to decrease the 
amount of time and manual effort required to designate a widget suitable for the operational 
Storefront environment. 
Upon completion of the preceding tests, the results will be aggregated and compiled 
for the Approval Board subprocess. The Board may determine that a WSP needs to be 
returned to the T&I Test Team if the results did not demonstrate acceptable functional, 
information assurance or integration testing results (5). A widget may also be ordered to be 
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deployment to the operational Storefront environment (6). Additionally, a WSP may be 
rejected if the content rendered or output of the widget is deemed to be inappropriate or of 
no added value in the Storefront environment (7), or approved, making it available to the 
warfighter in from the production Storefront environment (8). 
Challenges 
While the widgets process discussed is technical feasible, and superior to the current 
acquisition system, there remain significant challenges to the implementation of the widgets 
governance framework. There are a number of different individuals and offices in the DoD 
that must be “brought on board” for this process to work.  
The first crucial step is for the DoD as a whole to understand the importance of 
acquisition reform, in particular, acquisition reform that is designed to facilitate the rapid 
acquisition of software applications and widgets. Fortunately, progress is being made in this 
realm at the Department of Defense level. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) Frank Kendall has been working on a series of 
Better Buying Power initiatives designed to reform the acquisitions process and change the 
culture of the acquisitions community within the DoD. Most recently, released in November 
2013, his Better Buying Power 2.0 strategy focuses on continuing to increase performance 
while implementing new initiatives. As Kendall states in his memo, “this represents a 
management philosophy of continuous improvement in our acquisition practices.” The 
strategy is divided into seven focus areas, in each of these areas there are several new 
initiatives. The following initiatives are particularly important for increasing the acceptance 
and the future implementation of the agile acquisition process need for the DoD application 
stores.  
In the focus area “Control Costs Throughout the Product Lifecycle” the initiative 
regarding the cost performance of programs and institutions is particularly applicable to the 
use of C2 widgets and apps. The initiative states,  
Institute a system to measure the cost performance of programs and 
institutions and to assess the effectiveness of acquisition policies: The 
Department will become more data driven in assessing its own and industry’s 
performance at achieving improved productivity. The Department will develop 
metrics for the programs and institutions (government and nongovernment) 
within the acquisition system and assess performance to better understand 
best practices in industry and government.  
The process of developing a new widget and sending it through the governance 
process described in Figure 2 takes measurably less time and manpower than the current 
system of deploying new capabilities into the systems manually. Thus, if widgets and the 
applications stores are examined with the metrics to be developed by this initiative, they will 
be proven to be more cost effective. Additionally, widgets enable an existing program of 
record to be updated without large costs, thereby reducing the total lifecycle cost of any C2 
program of record.  
In the focus area “Eliminate Unproductive Processes and Bureaucracy” the initiative 
focusing on reducing cycle time while ensuring sound investment decisions speaks directly 
to the problem that the widget governance system can solve. The initiative states,  
Reduce cycle times while ensuring sound investment decisions: This initiative 
will assess the root causes for long product cycle times, particularly long 
development cycles, with the goal of significantly reducing the amount of 
time, and therefore cost, it takes to bring a product from concept to fielding. 
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The widget governance process will achieve the stated “goal of significantly reducing 
the amount of time, and therefore cost” while deploying C2 widgets that the end user has 
had significant input into. This will create a better product, while reducing time and cost.  
Finally, in the focus area “Promote Effective Competition” the initiative focusing on 
open system architectures will encourage the creation of many different widgets, as the 
underlying system (in this case OWF) has an open architecture. The initiative states,  
Enforce open system architectures and effectively manage technical data 
rights: This item is continued from BBP 1.0 and will focus on improving the 
Department’s early planning for open architectures and the successful 
execution of the plan to provide for open architectures and modular systems. 
The expansion of the use of open architectures and modular systems in software 
design will encourage many different widget developers, potentially across the Services, to 
create, test and validate widgets that can be used across different platforms. As the number 
of widgets created and used increases, the ability of the end user to create truly composable 
C2 increases as well.  
As the focus areas and initiatives in the DoD’s Better Buying Power 2.0 show, there 
is a lot of room for growth in the acquisitions system, however some progress is being 
made. Unfortunately, the fact that many of the initiatives in Better Buying Power 2.0, 
released in 2013, are identical to those from Better Buying Power 1.0, released in 2010, 
highlights the difficulty in changing the culture in the DoD.  
Acquisition Culture Change 
While the acquisition culture is moving in the right direction, the progress continues 
to be incremental and the pace continues to be glacial. Initiatives like the Better Buying 
Power 2.0 confront a key fact in the DoD that culture change needs to happen across a 
broad organization composed of a large number of individuals with often competing 
incentives. For the just widget governance process alone, there are a large number of 
individuals and organizations which need to “buy in” to the process change. As Figure 2 
shows for widget governance the following list of individuals and organizations are the 
minimum number of participants which need to accept the process:  
1. The widget developer: the developer needs to have the incentive to produce 
a widget  
2. The program of record (POR): the POR needs to work with the widget 
developer to ensure the widget is viable, and also needs to work closely with 
the PEO C4I Widget Test and Integration team  
3. The PEO C4I Widget Test and Integration (T&I) Team: the T&I team must be 
able to provide feedback to the widget developer on improvements needed to 
make the widget compliant with the Operational PEO C4I Storefront 
standards, and do this in a timely fashion  
4. The Office of Designating Approval Authority (ODAA): like the T&I team the 
ODAA must be able to judge the compliance of the widget in a timely fashion  
5. Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation (COMOPTEV): the 
COMOPTEV must be able to approve the widget 
6. The Operational Storefront Environment: the operational storefront (in this 
case the PEO C4I Storefront) must be operational and accessible to the 
operational user  
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7. The Operational User: the operational user must be aware that he or she can 
discover the widget from a Marketplace (applications store) and encouraged 
to consume the capability in an operational environment  
Despite the many hurdles that the widget and storefront still has to face, it has 
become clear that the DoD can no longer continue down its current acquisition path of 
providing yesterday’s solutions to meet today’s immediate needs. The DoD must modify its 
view of acquisition. As technology is constantly evolving and improving, the DoD struggles 
to keep up with the latest capabilities and hinders itself with lengthy acquisition schedules 
and rising costs. The current commercial trend of delivering small, lightweight mobile 
applications to an application store allows industry leaders to provide a consistent stream of 
new capabilities to its customers. The DoD, however, has struggled to adopt this notion of 
rapid fielding of capabilities. 
The future of warfare is information superiority and speed to capability. Lightweight 
web applications can supply the warfighter with valuable information and can be developed 
in a short period time since they are comprised of a generally small amount of code. With 
shortened development times, immediate user needs can be addressed and satisfied more 
quickly. This will increase the ability of the warfighter to utilize agile C2 to address rapidly 
changing scenarios in the field. The reduction in time and cost to field a solution goes 
directly to the heart of agile C2. Widgets provided by an already accredited PoR do not need 
to undergo the Certification and Accreditation processes that lengthen acquisition schedules 
and ultimately consume costs. New widget technologies and smaller testing efforts that 
make them available within an application store will introduce a paradigm shift in the 
development and delivery of capabilities to the warfighter. Using the widget framework the 
operator is not only able to be successful but is able to maintain “success in light of changed 
or changing circumstances”15 a key component of agile C2. The PEO C4I Storefront 
provides an example of how quickly widgets can be created and fielded when they are 
associated with an already accredited PoR. It behooves the DoD to examine its acquisition 
paths and to adopt widgets and associated storefronts at an accelerated pace in order to 
enable agile C2.  
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